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DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S 
Case No. 18285 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff-appellant for 
an alleged infringement of trade name "High Country." Plaintiff-
appellant claims registration of the name High Country Club 
and defendant-respondent claims registration of the name of 
High Country Inn and High Country Inn Restaurant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court in and for the County of 
Weber, the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding, found in favor 
of the defendant-respondent and declared that the name "High-
Country" is a geographic name; that it is not entitled to 
protection as a trade name unless it has obtained a secondary 
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meaning and that the burden of proving a secondary meaning 
is on the party asserting such meaning; that the plaintiff-
l • 
appellant neither asserted nor articulated a secondary meaning 
and it was not entitled to prote6tion and dismissed plaintiff-
appellant's suit,· no cause of action. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirmation of the lower 
court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant owned a building used for a 
lounge and other purposes located on Wall Avenue near 12th 
Street in Ogden, Utah. Some time in 1977 (R-85), plaintiff-
appellant commenced operation of a lounge on said property 
under the name of "High Country Club" (R-98, R-103). 
Plaintiff-appellant filed this name under d/b/a with the 
Secretary of State in 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit M). 
Defendant-respondent operated a motel in Heber 
Utah, in 1977 under the name of Stardust Inn and changed the 
name to "High Country Inn" in 1977. Defendant-respondent filed 
a d/b/a with the secretary of state in 1977, registering the 
name "High Country Inn" (Plaintiff's Exhibit L). In 1977, 
the Utah law permitted anyone to file a d/b/a using any name 
without regard to its use by other parties (R-114), 42-2-5, 
UCA, 1953. In 1979, the law was changed, giving the Secretary 
-2-
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of State the responsibility of monitoring the registration of 
names and determining whether or not the names were deceptively 
similar, 42-2-6.5, UCA, 1953. 
Plaintiff-appellant operated his tavern under 
the "High Country Club" logo and limited his advertising 
to signs at place of business and in the yellow pages of the 
local telephone directories under the heading "Taverns" for the 
years 1977 through 1981 (R-98, 99, 100, 101). Not until 1981 
(R-102) did plaintiff-appellant advertise in the yellow pages 
of the local telephone directory under "Restaurants" using the 
name High Country Inn Restaurant. Plaintiff-appellant did no 
other advertising (R-109, R-110). 
Plaintiff-appellant was licensed with Ogden City to 
sell beer in this private club during the years 1977, 1978 and 
1979. Not until the year 1980 did plaintiff-appellant expand 
this operation to a public restaurant (R-104, R-105~. 
Defendant-respondent filed a d/b/a "High Country Inn" 
in 1977 doing business in Heber City, Utah, in the business of 
motel and restaurant (Plaintiff's Exhibit L). Subsequently, 
defendant-respondent planned and ultimately constructed the 
~ motel and restaurant on 12th Street in Ogden, Utah,,near the 
freeway entrance and exit; signs announcing the construction of 
the motel were placed on the, property in 1978 and the motel and 
the restaurant were opened for business in 1979 (motel) and 1980 
(restaurant) (R-136, R-144). Defendant-respondent filed a d/b/a 
with the secretary of state to add the name "Restaurant" to 
"High Country Inn" in 1980 (R-117; Defendant's Exhibit 30). 
-3-
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Defendant-respondent leased,the restaurant part of the Inn, and 
it operates under the name "Moore's High Country Inn Restaurant" 
(R-105, R-159, R-161). 
Plaintiff-appellant was aware that the motel was to be 
built, because of the preconstruction advertising in 1978 (R-
172, R-136) indicating the name and location of the motel. 
Defendant-respondent has done considerable advertising 
in trade journals and highway signs since 1978 (R-136, R-164, R-
165, R-166). 
The evidence is conflicting concerning what confusion 
has resulted from the similarity of the names, if any (R-153). 
Witnesses for the defendant-respondent indicate that there have 
been no calls made to the restaurant operated under the name of 
"Moore's High Country Inn Restaurant" (R-153, R-167); however, 
.. 
there had been calls made to the motel asking for different 
individuals by name indicating that such individuals were in the 
back room or in the pool room (R-166,.R-167). Plaintiff-appellant 
indicates that on one or two occasions banquet sized groups 
appeared at his establishment for supposed reservations. 
Defendant-respondent witnesses indicated that it is not un-
common for a banquet to be reserved and no one show up (R-159). 
Although plaintiff-appellant claims confusion in the 
names, he advertised in the yell~w pages under the name "High 
country Restaurant" in the telephone directory in "1981" and 
under the categories "Restaurants and Taverns" rather than the 
name "High country Club" under "Taverns" only as in previous 
years (198 O and prior) (R-103, R-110) . 
-4-
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ll~ 
), 
The witness from the secretary of state's office 
called by plaintiff-appellant testified that the name of "High 
Country" is a geographic name that is not entitled to protection 
per se, the name "club" designates a private rather than public 
operation and the name "restaurant". and "inn" are not decep-
tively similar to the word "club" attached to such term as High 
Country (R-118, R-119, R-121). There are some 22 businesses 
that have registered with the secretary of state's office in 
Utah (R-118, Defendant's Exhibit 28) with the name "High Country" 
as a prefix to their logo. Plaintiff-appellant claims ownership 
to the geographical term uhigh country" without having to be 
attached to any other term (R-103). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTIVE TERM IS NOT LEGALLY PROTECTABLE 
UNTIL ITS CLAIMED OWNER HAS ATTAINED A SECONDARY MEANING 
IN THE MARKET PLACE. SUCH SECONDARY MEANING CAN ONLY 
BE OBTAINED THROUGH EXTENSIVE USE AND ADVERTISING. 
Geographic terms con'sist of the names of topographical 
features, mountains, lakes, rivers, streams, waterfalls, and 
forests. 
Geographic names are common property and are not 
subject to ownership unless the name has acquired special meaning 
in the public to the product or service to which it is attached. 
In 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Trademarks and Tradenames, Section 59, it 
states: 
"Mere geographical names are ordinarily regarded 
as common property, and it is a general rule, subject 
to certain qualifications and exceptions hereinafter 
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not:d, that such a name cannot be appropriated as the 
subJect of an exclusive trademark or tradename ••• 
alth~ugh when so used as to acquire a secondary 
meaning, the user may be entitled to protection 
against unfair use •.• " 
In Trade Protection and Practice, Jerome Gilson, Vol. 
II, Sec. 2.07, it states: 
"Section 2 of the Lanham Act recognizes the prin-
ciple that geographically descriptive terms which 
attain secondary meaning are entitled to legal pro-
tection and federal registration. The section denies 
registration to a mark which, 'when applied to the 
goods of the applicant is primarily geographically 
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them,' 
unless it 'has become distinctive of the applicant's 
goods in commerce.' The statutory rule as to regis-
trability corresponds in general to the- attitude 
of the courts in infringement or unfair competition 
cases. Thus, judicial relief is ordinarily granted 
where the geographically descriptive term has 
attained secondary meaning through extensive use 
and advertising. Here, the public has come to regard 
the term as identifying the source of the product 
or service and as distinguishing it from those of 
others, and relief is forthcoming in order to prevent 
confusion and deception •••• 
" •.. Primarily geographic associations may be dis-
pelled by combining the geographic term with other 
words to form a composite trademark, so that the 
mark in its entirety carries primarily non-geographic 
associations." 
Arbitrary or fanciful names such as KODAK, EXXON, and 
ZUBAN are inherently distinctive and are eligible for legal 
protection without a showing of secondary meaning. One reason 
such names are almost immediately protectable is because they 
convey instant trademark meaning_ to the public. 
Less distinctive names, however, do not convey such 
meaning to the public and must obtain a secondary meaning through 
use. In Trade Protection and Practice cited above, in sec. 2.09 
it states: 
-6-
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" •.• ~on~ these are descriptive terms, geographically 
des7ript7ve terms, personal names, grade or quality 
designations, slogans,. literary titles, trade dress 
or packaging collocations,·and non-functional product 
and contrainer configurations. With few exceptions 
these designations and matter ordinarily do not, at 
least initially, perform the critical trademark function 
of identifying to the public the source of products 
and distinguishing them from the products of others. 
In their primary sense they may give the consumer 
various kinds of information about the product, how 
it operates, or where it was made, or they may be 
simply decorative in nature. These meanings are not 
generally regarded as trademark meanings, and hence 
they usually do not qualify the particular term or 
designation for legal protection. In time, however, 
through extensive use and advertising, such terms 
may take on a new, or secondary meaning, becoming 
regarded by the public as designating the source of 
the products and distinguishing them from the products 
of others. When and if this shift of meaning occurs 
in the marketplace, trademark protection is available. 
" ..• Secondary meaning has been defined as 'association, 
nothing more.' It is the association in the public 
mind between a product and its source which occurs 
when an inherently nondistinctive designation attains 
secondary meaning, or changes from being non-dis-
tinctive to being distinctive of the particular 
product. Section 2(f) of the Act expresses the same 
concept by providing for principal register trademark 
registration when a non-distinctive designation has 
'become distinctive of the applicant's goods in com-
merce.• Thus, 'secondary meaning' and 'distinctive-
ness' are frequently employed synonymously, to express 
the same concept. So too is the term 'special sig-
nificance', which is used in the Restatement. Com-
menting on the secondary meaning doctrine, one court 
has said: 
" •.. Whether or not an inherently non-distinctive 
designation has attained secondary meaning is a 
question of fact in each case. The court typically 
evaluates all of the facts which tend to prove or 
disprove a shift ~f meaning from nontrademark ~o 
trademark, doing so in the context of the applicable 
burden of proof. The burden of proving secondary 
meaning is on the party asserting it, whether he is 
the plaintiff in an infringement action or the appli-
cant for federal trademark registration. The burden 
is ordinarily considered a heavy one, since one result 
may be to deprive the public of the free use of the 
-7-
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particular term in relation to certain products.or 
services. In one case the burden was characterized 
as 'substantial' where the term indicated a principal 
product ingredient which the public desired, and in 
other cases courts have found that a plaintiff seeking 
to establish secondary meaning must satisfy 'rigorous 
evidentiary requirements.' In general, the greater 
the degree of descriptiveness the term has, the 
heavier the burden to prove it has attained secondary 
meaning. 
" ... Proof of secondary meaning is often difficult, 
inasmuch as there are no precise guidelines and no 
single factor which is determinative ...• The factors 
and the types of proof the courts consider are the 
following: 
"l. The Purchasing Public and Direct Consumer 
Testimony. Testimony of members of the purchasing 
public is probably the most relevant type of testimony 
on the issue of whether a particular non-distinctive 
term has attained secondary meaning •••• 
"2. Consumer Surveys. A properly conducted survey 
of the relevant purchasing public may be the best 
direct evidence on the question of secondary meaning ..•. 
"3. Advertising and Sales. The degree and manner 
of advertising under the claimed trademark, and the 
volume of sales of products bearing it, are relevant 
proof on the issue of secondary meaning ••.• 
"4. Length and Manner of Use. In addition to the 
extent of advertising and promotion under the claimed 
trademark, the length and manner of its use bear direc-
tly on the issue of secondary meaning. The longer the 
claimed mark has been used, the greater the likelihood 
secondary meaning will attach .... 
"5. Exel usi vi ty of Use. Whether or not plaintiff's 
use of the claimed trademark has been exclusive is 
also material on the issue of secondary meaning. To 
the extent that third parties are using the claimed 
mark in association with the same or related goods or 
services, its impact on the public consciousness is 
likely to be less and the public is less likely to 
associate it with a single source of products. This 
is especially true if a third party began using the 
term before the plaintiff. Here, secondary meaning 
will not be likely to attach." 
-8-
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or 
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant presented no 
testing of consumer surveys, admitted that little or no adver-
tising had been done, and acknowledged that the name "High Country 
I 
Restaurant" had not been used by him until after suit had been 
filed. Further, undisputed testimony indicated that defendant-
respondent had used and advertised the name "High Country Inn," 
"High Country Restaurant," and "Moore's High _c;_oun~.ry Inn Res-
taurant" from 1978, prior to plaintiff-appellant's claimed use. 
Courts have long required the usage of a name in time 
and locality to be entitled to injunctive protection. Some of 
the more recent cases are: 
In Lift Truck Parts & Service, Inc. v. Bourne (1963), 
385 P.2d 735, the Supreme Court of Oregon, said: 
" .•. Despite the defendants' contentions to the 
contrary, an arrangement of purely generic or des-
criptive words can acquire secondary meaning and 
thereby create protectible interest in a trade name .••• 
However, where the name question is one primarily 
composed of generic or descriptive words, it is 
much more difficult to prove a secondary meaning 
than in cases where the words used in the trade-
name have some distinctive or identifying character 
of.their own ••..•. the burden of proof of secondary 
meaning is upon the party claiming the exclusive 
right to the generic or descriptive words as a trade 
name." 
In Wyoming Nat. Bank v. Security Bank & Trust Co. 
(1977), Wyo., 572 P.2d 1120, the Wyoming Supreme Court said: 
" ... Unless a trade name is confusing and deceptive 
on its face, those seeking such protection must 
take the burden or proving that they have given 
to their trade names a secondary meaning through 
years of usage .... Use of a name for a long period 
of time alone is evidence of the association between 
that name and particular goods and services." 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in MacPhail v. Stevens, 
Colo. App., 586 P.2d 1339, stated: 
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"And, contrary to MacPhail's assertions, the 
name "Denver Magazine" is not so "inherently dis-
tinctive" as to be exclusively appropriable as a 
trademark immediately upon use, without regard to 
whether it has acquired a secondary meaning. Rather, 
"Denver" is a geographic designation, and "Magazine" 
is a generic or descriptive term, and neither sing-
ularly nor in combination are these words entitled 
to trademark protection without a showing that a 
secondary meaning has attached to them." 
The Supreme Court of Washington in Zebra Distributing 
Co. v. Ace Fireworks, Inc. (1969), 450 P.2d 962, affirmed the 
Trial Court's dissolving injunction where lower court concluded 
that plaintiff-appellant in that case had not proved name had 
acquired a secondary meaning. The Washington court stated: 
"The essence of such an action.is unfair compe-
tition and the existence of such competition is 
always a question of fact. The factual controversy 
in this case was resolved by the trial court's con-
clusion that plaintiff-appellant had not shown that 
its marks had acquired a secondary meaning .•. " 
The trial in this case found that the name claimed by 
plaintiff-appellant had not acquired a secondary meaning. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Coalgate Abstract Co. 
v. Coal County Abstract Co. (1937), 67 P.2d, in commenting on 
the use of geographic names and acquiring secondary meaning, 
stated: 
"Geographical names, terms, and words, as well 
as descriptive words, may not be exclusively appro-
priated. This is the unequivocal rule of the conunon 
law and is statutory in this state. 
The Oklahoma court went on to comment concerning the 
degree of similarity required to justify an injunction, as follows: 
"The rule is well stated in the case of Hilton 
v. Hilton, 89 N.J.Eq. 472, 106 A. 193, 140, as 
follows: 'The rule of course, is that the similitude 
must be sufficient to confuse an ordinarily prudent 
-10-
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man, but the test as to the care or prudence is, 
are the precautions which a reasonably prudent man 
would take when investing money or what not, but 
the precautions which he would take ordinarily in 
determining, in buying a suit of clothes, that he 
was in the store he thought he was in." 
In the present case, the plaintiff-appellant operated 
and advertised a tavern and private club from 1977 to 1980. 
Not until after he filed suit did he advertise as a restaurant. 
The defendant-respondent's use of the name "High Country Inn" 
is for a motel. Defendant-respondent's restaurant is leased 
out and operated under the name "Moore's High Country Inn 
Restaurant." A careful and prudent person would find little 
or no confusion between the names and business that are operated 
under them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT TWO 
BURDEN OF PROVING NAME HAD ATTAINED SECONDARY MEANING 
IS UPON THE ONE WHO SEEKS INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN. 
The burden of proof in an action for infringement or 
unfair competition relating to trademarks is on the plaintiff. 
In 74 Am. Jur. 2d 818 {Trademarks and Tradenames), Sec. 168, it 
states: 
"Questions as to burden of proof and presumptions 
in actions for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition are governed in the main by the general 
rules which are applied in other actions of a similar 
character. Thus, the burden rests upon the plaintiff 
to establish a prima facie case." 
It is further stated in 74 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 819, con-
cerning the doctrine of secondary meaning, as follows: 
-11-
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"The question whether a word or symbog has acquired 
a secondary, special, or trade meaning is one of 
fact. The burden of establishing the existence of 
such meaning ordinar~ly rests with the plaintiff. 
Thus, one claiming that a trademark consisting of 
descriptive terms has acquired a secondary meaning so 
as to be entitled to protection bears the burden of 
proving that the terms have come to represent, in the 
mind of the public, the producer rather than the 
product. Since generic marks are the actual names of 
the product, it is necessary for the producer to show 
that he actually succeeded in associating the term 
with the source in the public's mind. However, when 
the term is not generic but merely descriptive, an 
inference of secondary meaning, properly supported, 
seems to be enough. 
Utah has followed the requirement of putting the 
burden upon the one seeking to establish a secondary meaning 
upon the plaintiff. In Cloverleaf Dairy Co. ·v. Van Gerven, 269 
P. 1020, 72 Utah, 290, the Utah court held that the plaintiffs 
seeking the restraining order had the burden of proving their 
case. 
OtHer courts, including the Oregon court in 88¢ Stores, 
Inc. v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 809, 227 Oregon 147, h~ld that the 
plaintiff, who seeks injunction to restrain defendant from using 
plaintiff's business name, on the ground that it acquired a 
secondary meaning, had the burden of proving the facts of a 
secondary meaning in confusion of source. 
The Oregon Court (1963), in Lift Truck Parts cited 
above, placed the burden of proof of secondary meaning of 
generic name upon the party claiming exclusive right to its use. 
The Wyoming Court (1979), in First National Bank of 
Lander v. First Wyoming Savings and Loan Association, 592 P.2d 
697, placed the burden upon those seeking protection to estab-
lish that their name had acquired a secondary meaning. 
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In the present case, appellant has indicated that on 
one or two occasions, he received calls for what may have been 
High Country Inn placing banquet orders and that the people 
placing the order subsequently failed to show. Evidence pre-
sented by defendant-respondent indicates that this is pot 
infrequent in the banquet business. In 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 74, 
p. 821, Sec. 172, it states: 
"Mere advertising or other evidence of supposed 
secondary meaning cannot convert something unregis-
terable by reason of its being the common descriptive 
name or generic name for the goods, into a regis-
terable mark. In order to prove a secondary meaning, 
the individual members of the purchasing public, or 
retailers or salesmen, are frequently called as 
witnesses and questioned as to their mental 
reactions. In general, the view taken by the 
general public, rather than by dealers or their 
buyers, is controlling as to whether a term or 
design alleged to have acquired the secondary 
meaning signifies origin or source, and it is not 
sufficient to show th~t wholesale dealers identify 
the source or origin of a product by the term or 
design in dispute." 
Plaintiff-appellant testified that there is some con-
fusion in the initial deliveries of goods to defendant/respondents' 
business location by tradesmen servicing local businesses. How-
ever, in Frostig v. Saga Enterprises, Inc., 539 P.2d 154, 272 
Oregon 565, the Oregon Court (1975) indicateg that c~nfusion 
on the part of persons who are not restaurant customers, such 
as taxi drivers, creditors, prospective employees of defendants, 
telephone operators, is not-the type of confusion against which 
common law had traditionally offered tradename protection, and 
that such evidence will only serve circumstantial evidence of 
confusion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT THREE 
FILING A D/B/A DOES NOT CONFER THE RIGHT TO A TRADE 
NAME OR TRADEMARK. 
At the time of filing of the d/b/a by both parties 
(1977), 42-2-5 UCA, 1953, provided as follows: 
"Every person or persons who shall carry on, con-
duct or transact business in this state under an 
assumed name, whether such business be carried on, 
conducted or transacted as an individual, associa-
tion, partnership, corporation or otherwise, shall 
file in the off ice of the secretary of state a 
certificate setting forth the name under which such 
business is, or is to be carried on, conducted or 
transacted, and the future name, or names, of the 
person or persons owning, and the person or persons 
carrying on, conducting or transacting such business, 
the location of the principal place of business and 
the post-office address, or addresses, of such 
person or persons. Such certificate shall be exe-
cuted by the person or persons owning, and the person 
or persons carrying on, conducting or transacting 
such business, and shall be filed not later than 
thirty days after the time of commencing to carry on, 
conduct or transact said business. 
In 1979, additional responsibility was placed on the 
secretary of state for filing of assumed names. 42-2-6.5 UCA 
1953 provides as follows: 
"(l) The secretary of state shall not accept a 
certificate for filing if the assumed name therein is 
the same as, or deceptively similar to, the name of 
any corporation authorized to do business in this 
state, a name which is reserved or registered in this 
state pursuant to statµte, the name of a trademark 
or service mark registered with the secretary, or 
an assumed name which is filed and on the active list. 
"(2) The secretary shall accept a certificate for 
filing although the assumed name therein is deceptively 
similar to a name, trademark or service mark mentioned 
in subsection (1), if the person or corporation en-
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titled to use the name, trademark or service mark, 
has filed a written consent to the similarity with 
the secretary. 
"(3) The secretary shal~ have the discretion to 
determine what names are deceptively similar. 
The above statute requires the filing when doing business 
under an assumed name to afford the public knowledge concerning 
persons doing business under an assumed name. 
To register a name for a trade name or trademark, 
separate provisions are provided. 
70-3-3 UCA, 1953, provides registration requirements 
to file a trade name or trademark. 
Neither plaintiff-appellant or defendant-respondent 
filed for a trademark or trade name under the provisions of 
the Utah law. In MacPhail v. Stevens cited above, the Colorado 
Court of Appeal in distinguishing between similar statutes in , 
Colorado stated: 
"(l) At the outset, we agree with the trial 
court that MacPhail's filing a certificate of 
assumed or trade name did not confer on him the 
right to use "Denver Magazine" as a trademark. 
Such registration is intended only to afford the 
public a means of ascertaining the identities of 
persons or entities doing business under an assumed 
name .•. " 
CONCLUSION 
Both plaintiff and defendant in this case filed a 
Certificate of Doing Business Under An Assumed Name. Plaintiff's 
Certificate was filed on January 7, 1977 where he indicated he 
was doing business under the assumed name of "High Country Club." 
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Defendant filed a Certificate on August 29, 1977 indicating he 
was doing business under the assumed name of "High Country Inn" 
and that the nature of the business was motel, restaurant, and 
a lounge. That particular business filing was for a motel, 
restaurant, and lounge in Heber City, Utah. Subsequently, 
defendant filed a Certificate of Doing Business Under An Assumed 
Name "High Country Inn" for a business located on 12th Street in 
Ogden, Utah on December 11, 1980. He filed a consent receipt 
and was issued a Certificate Doing Business Under the name of 
"High Country Inn Restaurant" from the Secretary of State on 
April 28, 1980. 
High Country Inn (1977) and High Country Inn Restau-
rant (1980) names were both registered by defendant-respondent · 
with the secretary of state, and such registration is deter-
minative that the secretary of state did not consider the names 
deceptively similar to High Country Club. 
The name "High Country" is a geographic name not 
entitled to protection without being part of an additional 
term. 
Plaintiff-appellant fails to present sufficient 
evidence of a secondary meaning of the name "High Country 
Restaurant." 
The name of defendant-respondent's leased restaurant, 
"Moore's High Country Restaurant," is neither deceptive nor 
confusing to plaintiff-appellant's name of "High Country Club." 
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Respectfully submitted, 
this ~ day of July, 1982 
~ p·~R~O~E~RE~R--=>--==-~,..........__-
A t torn e y for Defendant-Respondent 
536 24th Street, Suite 2B 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above Appeal Brief to PETE N. VLAHOS, attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
postage prepaid, this _r__·day of July, 1982. 
Secretary 
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